Drama as Ethical Education

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ABSTRACT In this article the author outlines a theory of drama as ethical education. He contrasts his theoretical and philosophical framework, which is grounded in the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin, with what he argues is the neo-Aristotelian approach developed by Joe Winston. In an analysis of several practical examples he examines the pedagogical implications of both frameworks and illustrates differences in assumptions about what it means to become ethical. He considers the relevance of a theory of discourse for analysing how ethical understandings can develop in dialogue about narratives. Further, he discusses how the concept of positioning can complicate our view of the ethical dimension of ongoing interactions in and out of role. Finally, the author shows how dialogic sequencing can create conditions in which students may begin to re-examine the ethical assumptions of their discourses. He closes by raising what he considers to be some of the more pressing questions about drama’s potential as ethical education.

Introduction

How do we become ethical? This question, which people in every society from agrarian Greece to post-industrial America have pondered, has gained a sense of urgency for many educators in the wake of recent homicides by children on both sides of the Atlantic. Calls for character education in the United States and moral education in Britain suggest that people still assume that teachers in schools have a responsibility to bring an ethical dimension to education.

Drama’s potential in ethical education has until recently been considered by few scholars (Colby, 1982, 1987; Winston, 1994, 1995, 1996; Edmiston, 1994, 1995, 1998a, 1998c). With the publication of Joe Winston’s (1998) book, Drama, Narrative and Moral Education, there is now likely to be more serious consideration of the power of drama as ethical education [1]. In this article I outline a theoretical and philosophical framework of drama as ethical education, which is grounded in the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin. I examine the pedagogical implications of the framework as I compare and contrast it with the neo-Aristotelian approach developed by Joe Winston. I believe that it is important to recognise areas of agreement and difference in order to use these to generate further discussion about the place and value of drama in ethical education. It is in this spirit of hopefulness that I have written this article.
Winston has developed an extensive argument proposing that classroom drama can be significant in students’ moral education, enabling them to express, explore, and develop complex conceptual moral understandings. Having advanced a similar but much sketchier argument myself (1995), I am in complete agreement with him on this major thrust of his book. As someone who has been critical of the theoretical assumptions which underpin and dominate the fields of moral education and moral development, I am indebted to Winston for his compelling synthesis and critique of, in particular, the theoretical positions of Lawrence Kohlberg. Though I have some fundamental disagreements about the adequacy of neo-Aristotelian theory as an alternative framework, nevertheless Winston has used this approach to develop powerful arguments for using classroom drama in moral education. In this introductory section I lay out a conceptual map for readers comparing neo-Aristotelian and Bakhtinian theories of ethics [2].

**Philosophical and Theoretical Differences**

At the core of differences in our philosophical and theoretical views are our conceptualisations of the self in relation to others. Winston’s neo-Aristotelian framework promotes an atomistic view of the self—seeing people as inherently separate from each other and from the world. Becoming moral is a personal quest. There is an underlying belief that we can come to know the world, including morality, through rational, logical analysis of a situation. Winston wants children to study virtues and to talk about how virtues operate in particular situations, especially in stories, so that they might understand them in more complexity and rely on them later as moral guides. Though he advocates critical analysis and debate, his is a socially conservative view of society and morality, with his aim being that through their analysis of stories, and use of drama to do so, children can learn to be more virtuous in the social roles they are born into or acquire.

Rather than seeing individual virtuous behaviours in a fixed view of society as the goal, my aim is ethical social responsibility and critical analysis not only of narratives but also of societal relations—equitable and inequitable—from the viewpoints of all its members. The Bakhtinian framework that undergirds my approach views the self as comprehensible in terms both of how people view each other and how they view themselves. Thus, being and becoming ethical is a social project, not an individual journey. Values are not acquired from outside us, but rather, they are forged in dialogue among people and texts. Thus, encounters with stories or people, in everyday life and in the imagination of drama, are sites for dialogue through which we can become clearer about the ethical views we or others already hold and through which our ethical positions can change.

Bakhtin argues that understanding morality is a means to the end of acting ethically, and not an end in itself. As I argue in this paper, becoming ethical is not merely a rational endeavour—it involves imaginatively shifting of positions to extend experience to include multiple and often conflicting views of events. Following Bakhtin, our values are always already a part of how we view the world, whatever our age. Ethical views are a facet of all the language and thought we use and encounter daily.
The following chart outlines some of the key terms that I use as I explore the implications of our theoretical and conceptual differences. I will also consider conceptual differences in our use of other terms, especially ‘action’, ‘evaluate’, and ‘dialogue’.

### Table I. Philosophical and theoretical differences

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neo-Aristotelian</th>
<th>Bakhtinian</th>
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<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Self is always in relation to other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practice of virtues</td>
<td>Answerability</td>
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<td>Narrative</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
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<td>Dichotomise</td>
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### Ethical Evaluation of Action

**Two Approaches to Evaluating Action**

Winston’s view of action is related to ‘practising being virtuous’. He argues that in drama students come to understand the complexity of morality as they practise, or rehearse, being virtuous in different situations and in particular social roles, for example, showing fairness, forgiveness, or generosity.

Evaluation, for Winston, is most important when children evaluate acts for their virtue and consider whether such acts are indicative of the sort of person they would want to become. The stories explored and developed through drama will be ‘shared communal experiences’ which can also become shared moral reference points for a classroom community against which children can, with the aid of a teacher, ‘gauge their own actions and those of others whenever such references are needed on future occasions’ (1998, p. 117).

Winston proposes that classrooms would ideally become ‘communities of virtue’ with evolving moral conversations about the complexities of moral life (p. 174). Drama would be especially significant when the virtues embedded in narratives were ‘problematised, played with, subverted, reframed, or brought into conflict with one another’ (p. 176).

I fully endorse Winston’s vision of the classroom as a place where drama and narrative are integral to ongoing moral conversations that examine the complexities of being ethical. His view has much in common with Kohlberg’s idea of the school as a ‘just community’ (Power et al., 1989). However, I need to raise several practical and theoretical questions about how drama might advance such an ethical agenda.

How adequate as a moral compass is the neo-Aristotelian theory advanced by Winston? The theory is especially important in highlighting the need to explore the complexity of morality and in showing how making moral meaning in life is inextricably connected with the stories we know. However, I suggest that neo-Aristotelian theory alone is ultimately restricting. A view of action as rehearsal of virtuous behaviours and
a view of evaluation as assessing the sort of person I am to become severely limits our ethical expectations for the efficacy of drama.

Like the neo-Aristotelians, Bakhtin (1990, 1993) is highly critical of a Kantian quest for abstract moral principles to be applied universally. Similarly, he argues that ethics cannot be divorced from a consideration of how people act in specific situations. Like neo-Aristotelians, Bakhtin values written narratives, especially novels, as sources and sites of ethical deliberations and he regards people as authors of their own life narratives. However, rather than rely on rational interpretations of narratives for possible moral guidance in face-to-face interactions, Bakhtin’s (1984, 1986, 1990, 1993) theories of the self and ethics propose that one person’s actions must always be evaluated in relation to other people. Bakhtin’s relational view of the self extends Aristotle’s concern with moral end-points of action and personal virtuous outcomes. For Bakhtin, being ethical means evaluating actions as we are interacting in particular ‘prosaic’ moments. Thus, we are not only ethical when we have high stakes choices. We are ethical in the ordinariness of our everyday life interactions. Later reflection on action is essential, but Bakhtin also emphasises the importance of ongoing evaluation of action. Bakhtin’s (1986) concept of ‘outsideness’ emphasises that we must get outside our individual intention in order to view and evaluate our actions from the viewpoint of those affected. Concern for the type of person we might become can only be in relation to how others would or might relate to such a person. Thus, for Bakhtin acting ethically is much more socially and culturally interconnected and immediate than ‘practising the virtues’.

Bakhtin’s (1990, 1993) theory of ‘answerability’ is much more extensive than the prevalent, more limited view of seeing people as ‘responsible’ for their actions. For example, we might expect children to explain why they did something and have them live with the ‘natural consequences’ of their actions. Bakhtin proposes that in ethical action we must repeatedly balance attention on ourselves with attention on both how we evaluate the consequences of others’ actions and on how they evaluate the consequences of our actions. To judge myself ethically, I must be answerable to others’ evaluations of my actions at the same time as I expect them to be answerable to me, and answerable to others. The criminal justice system is based on a theory of responsibility—break the law and you know the consequences. For wrongdoers to be answerable would require perpetrators to attempt to know how victims feel, to hear them, to find out how their lives have been changed, and only then begin to answer their questions about what should happen now. However, a person’s answerability is never complete. Being answerable is ongoing as people shift positions, attend differently, and extend their evaluations of others’ actions as meanings and discourses of self and other are illuminated by public and private events.

Thus, Bakhtin argues that to be ethical we must always respond to the immediate and subsequent effect of actions on others; we should be as concerned with the social as much as with the personal aspects of morality, and with evaluating present actions as much as with interpreting future or past events. If we are to consider the ethics of our actions, then we must always be concerned with, and answerable for, the consequences of our actions and how they affect other people as well as ourselves. We remain answerable to others as they evaluate our present and past actions from different
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positions. In other words, asking Aristotle’s question ‘What sort of person am I to become?’ can be too limiting both socioculturally and in its sole orientation to the future. Bakhtin argues that instead we should in effect repeatedly ask questions like, ‘Am I acting ethically now in relation to others?’, ‘Did I act ethically then in relation to others?’ and ‘How might my actions affect others in the future?’.

Imagining Ethical (and Unethical) Actions

I have argued above that (a) acting ethically means being prepared to be answerable to anyone, at any time, for the consequences of my actions, and that (b) in ethical evaluation I consider how my actions affect, have affected, or are likely to affect other people. In this section I consider the relevance of drama to the ethical evaluation of actions. I make two proposals: (1) in drama we can adopt multiple positions in addition to those of our everyday lives; in imaginary immediate prosaic situations we can explore how we might have acted if we had adopted such positions; and (2) through drama we use imagination to shift positions so that we learn how to evaluate actions from the positions of those affected by the consequences of our actions.

Imagination is inextricably interconnected with ethics. Learning to be ethical requires that we use imagination to consider past, present and future events from other people’s positions (Johnson, 1993). Ethical actions in everyday life mean that we are answerable to people in face-to-face communications, whether or not we are immediately aware of this ethical relation. We pay attention to the meanings of the words and gestures others use, but in addition we are frequently imagining what they are thinking about us and how they may be evaluating us. Further, in order to consider how our actions have previously affected, or are likely to affect, other people, we use imagination to recall events and to project into past or possible future times and places. We can have imaginary dialogues with people as we answer the questions we imagine they might pose to us. Thus, interactions with others and consideration of how others might evaluate us requires imagination.

I hypothesise that drama provides children with a medium through which they could learn to use imagination in the ways we need to use it for ethical action in everyday life. When we act ethically in everyday life we imagine from other people’s positions. However, people do not do so automatically and may also have a limited range of positions from which they imagine. In contrast, through drama we can enact our imaginings and give them life. Children are able to shift to any location, many of which might not have occurred to them in a discussion. I suggest that repeated use of imagination in these ways through drama is likely to make it feel quite ‘normal’ to shift positions in imagination at other times.

Further, I propose that our ethical imagination can give us a vision of how the world could be different and what our lives would be like if we acted in different ways. Students and teacher imagine what it would mean to be ethical professionals in Heathcote’s (Heathcote & Bolton, 1995) ‘mantle of the expert’ approach to education. Her system is grounded in a prolonged exploration of what it would mean to act in the world as an ethical person, given one’s evolving vision of human relations. Heathcote is emphatic that the children invent a history of their enterprise that illustrates the
experts’ professional and ethical standards. In their projects and investigations over time, children can not only learn about the social, cultural, or historical dimensions of content in imagined and actual situations, but also explore, through imagination, the ethical dimensions of the problems and challenges that the experts face.

We often wonder ‘If I were in that person’s position, would I think and act in similar ways?’ In drama we can enact what we imagine. In imagination, we can be answerable to anyone for the consequences of our imagined actions as we pretend to interact with the people affected. By enacting what we imagine we can explore how people might be affected by the consequences of actions that we could not or would not take in everyday life. We can then shift positions to imagine how some of those people who might have been affected by the consequences of those actions might evaluate the original actions.

The mantle of the expert approach seems an ideal way to use drama to learn about ethical action. However, this does not preclude imagining with students that they are acting immorally. I argue that through drama we can imagine what would happen if we acted in ways that range along the full spectrum from good to evil deeds. Winston seems excessively concerned about children imagining that they act in ways that would be considered unethical. For example, he seems apprehensive about children even viewing violence in drama, and there is an implication in his book that only the teacher should represent immoral acts. However, it has been my experience that as children approach social problems and moral dilemmas, imagining that they are acting unethically may be the best place to begin.

As an example, I once spent 40 minutes imagining with two 13-year-old boys, who had been researching Mafia activities in the 1930s, that they were members of a Mafia family (Edmiston, 1998b). The boys were clearly fascinated with how people could have become involved in Mafia activities, though they said that if they had been alive at the time they would not have joined and would never have killed anyone. Our drama work became an exploration of how it might have been that such things happened. We imagined how, as young immigrants struggling to make money in America, they could have needed protection. We created narratives that explored why they might have hidden contraband goods and then been faced with a choice between prison or joining an illegal organisation. Under threat of violence to their families they chose to agree to show their loyalty and joined in a raid, which turned out to be the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre. We spent an entire class period imagining immoral acts, culminating in a machine gun attack with me representing a victim. However, we also shifted positions to evaluate the consequences of every action from outside the position of those caught up in what one of the boys called ‘the family of hate’. We moved among the positions of police officers, family members, Mafia people, and ourselves as researchers, to evaluate the consequences of proposed or previous actions: the police officers trying to stop corruption; the families terrified of what might happen to them; the Mafia people looking after their own; ourselves wondering why people would act as they did. As an evaluative lens we kept returning to their original belief that they would have been able to resist joining in violence. By the end of the session the boys said that they had changed their minds, saying that they thought they might well have become involved. Having acknowledged their potential to act in a way that countered their initial ethical beliefs, they could now begin to imagine how they might resist or challenge such a complex social dynamic.
I have argued in this section that in drama we can imagine actions and imagine how others might evaluate the consequences of those actions. None of this is to say that drama is not also about reacting to the deeds of other people. However, when we judge others’ actions, there is a persistent danger of moralising about what we would have done—giving advice without deeply considering why a person might have acted as they did and not in other ways. At worst we may begin to demonise others, feel completely separated from them, and find their actions incomprehensible. This was a trap, into which Winston sometimes seemed about to fall.

We will reduce or avoid our tendencies to moralise or demonise when we imagine from the position of people whose actions we are going to evaluate and judge; when we present and interpret images of their deeds we can try to understand their motivation at the same time as we critique or rethink the intersections of our value systems. This was what happened with the boys who were researching Mafia activities. They had been very judgemental, saying they could not understand why people had not just refused to join. It was not until the boys, in imagination, took up the position of those people whom they had judged, as well as the positions of others, that they began to understand possible motivation and became more empathetic with their dilemmas.

Finally, I want to add a note of caution about issues of cultural representation. The power of imagination to shift positions in order to experience from other perspectives seems potentially limitless. However, when we imagine the words and deeds of people from other positions we draw on the limited knowledge we already have about those particular social and cultural events. We always imagine what might have happened and the images of representations of those events are always incomplete. The boys who were researching the Mafia had been studying the topic for several weeks. I was also quite conversant with the period and events of the 1930s. Thus, I was not overly concerned about misrepresenting the realities faced by people at the time. Though our knowledge of events was extensive, it was, nevertheless, limited as always. I want to stress that when we represent people and dilemmas through drama, these are neither a substitute for discovering additional relevant cultural knowledge nor for discussing with students the incomplete nature of our knowledge about people who live or lived in other times and places with complex systems of values and relations that may be well beyond our imagining.

Analysis of an Example

In order to contrast the implications for drama work of a neo-Aristotelian and a Bakhtinian view of ethical evaluations of actions, I will analyse the major example which Winston gives of practising virtues (1998, pp. 115–117). The drama work was developed as a ‘sequel’ to an Indian folktale, ‘The Brahmin, the Thief and the Ogre’, that had previously been read, discussed, and morally critiqued by Winston and a class of 7–9-year-old children. The ogre did not appear in the sequel. In the original story the Brahmin hit the thief over the head before he could steal one of his calves. Before working through drama, the children chose possible morals of the original story from a list provided by the teacher. The most popular were ‘If you are kind you will be rewarded’ and ‘No matter how poor you are you must not steal’. Winston used the
latter as a focus for two 50-minutesessions. The children also volunteered examples of what they regarded as good ethical conduct (these included a farmer giving the Brahmin a calf) and bad ethical conduct (these included the thief stealing and the Brahmin hitting the thief).

Drama work began when in role as villagers the children first encountered Winston in role as the wife of the thief. They agreed to prevent her husband, the thief, from doing anything else wrong. Next they interrogated Winston in role as the thief, questioned him about his motives, discovered that he wanted the Brahmin to give him a calf, and discussed what ought to happen. They then met Winston in role as the Brahmin and tried to persuade him to share. Finally, in small groups they acted out an ending to the drama work.

Winston quotes and analyses an extract from the work when, in the role of the villagers, the children discussed with the teacher, in role as a Brahmin, how he should respond to the man who had previously stolen a calf, but who was now asking the Brahmin to give him one of his calves. Winston’s aim was to explore moral complexity through problematising the thief’s ‘vice’ of theft by placing it in conflict with a demand by him for the Brahmin to practice the ‘virtue’ of sharing.

Winston notes that via the discussion in the drama work, in addition to practising and applying the virtue of conflict mediation, the children were also able to argue for the virtues of generosity, fairness, forgiveness and compassion.

In this example, and almost without exception in the examples throughout Winston’s book, the students evaluated the consequences of other people’s actions—in this case those of the Brahmin and of the thief. What was missing was any evaluation of action actually taken by the students in role {3}. From his description, it seems that Winston invented the events in the narrative of the sequel. When the children met him in role he repeatedly narrated for them what he had invented had already happened—their purpose was to evaluate the morality of these different actions. This practice is not unlike the presentation of, and discussion about, moral dilemmas that Kohlberg used to elicit and extend children’s moral reasoning (1984). Though there is clearly value in moral discussions and the use of drama to bring them to life in the ways Winston describes, I argue that an exclusive use of such an approach is inadequate if drama is to be used for ethical education.

Drawing, in particular, on Bakhtinian theory, I propose alternative ways to structure the work. The teacher could have begun by asking the children, for example, ‘Why might a person in that time and place have been driven to take an animal like a calf for food, even when the person knew it was stealing?’ Through discussion and using dramatic conventions with the teacher, the children could have considered the teacher’s ideas, but also imagined, presented, extended and interpreted some of their own images and ideas about such an ethical dilemma. The ambiguity of the situation would be inherent in any subsequent dramatic explorations because the events to be explored would be about people who had been in positions torn between a need to take and a knowledge that they would be judged as doing wrong. In a variety of brief or extended encounters the children could have used drama to explore both how others might have evaluated these actions and how those who had stolen might have evaluated the judgements of others. By switching positions the children could have evaluated and
re-evaluated their actions from multiple viewpoints and the teacher could have adopted the position of any role to encounter the children for the purpose of assisting them in their ethical explorations. Examples of different positions include: the owners of stolen animals who are themselves hungry, those whose perceived need drove the people to steal and who are worried about being blamed, or the Gods who want to be fair to everyone. Further inventions could have occurred with the children for the purposes of tightening the moral dilemma and exploring some of the originally unforeseen consequences of actions. For example, what would the wife have done to get food? What would the Brahmin do at the funeral of the family of a child who died from starvation? How would a thief react to someone who had stolen from him?

Though my ideas for structuring the work are superficially similar to Winston’s example, there are significant differences that I hope illustrate how Bakhtin’s theories of ethics and the self can extend and differently inform practice that aims to develop ethical sensibilities in children.

Narratives and Discourses

Winston rightly argues that students need to recognise the value-laden nature of narratives. Rather than accept without question the values embedded in the narratives they read or hear, children need to be critical of the implicit morality of all stories. He stresses that ‘we need to remain alert to exactly what they are telling us’ (1998, p. 176, his emphasis).

I want to argue that Winston seems to regard narratives as ‘out there’ made by others and implies that when we evaluate actions in narratives that we can remain somehow detached from the characters or situations constructed in the story. Further, Winston seems to assume that maintaining the children in an evaluative position fairly distant from the emotional centre of a narrative, for example, as villagers who were not personally involved in the actions of the story, is sufficient for ethical engagement. I disagree with both assumptions. Central to my critique is an understanding of discourses.

Bakhtin (1981, 1984) conceptualises narratives as composed of discourses. Complex narratives, like novels, have a multitude of discourses, whereas more straightforward narratives like folktales are likely to have only a few. Discourses are embedded in specific situations but are deeper than the plot of a story. The characters in stories operate out of discourses explicitly and implicitly constructed by the author, who recognises (but also overlooks) different discourses, meanings, and social relations. In moralistic stories the discourses are never questioned within the narrative—these narratives have what Bakhtin calls more ‘monologic’ or ‘authoritative’ discourses and tell the reader what to think and how to evaluate. Novels, however, tend to be composed of more ‘dialogic’ or ‘internally persuasive’ discourses because characters and author are in complex dialogues about why people act as they do. The relations and consequences are uncertain and vary in meaning depending on the characters’ positionality relative to others.

Discourses are always intertextually connected with other people and with other narratives. Discourses are neither in specific locations, like particular books, nor are
they in individual people. Rather, they are dispersed among people, texts, and sociocultural events. Discourses have been constructed, developed, recorded, and changed over time in previous interactions between countless people. Some have become codified in laws, some entrenched in moral rules, and some are integral to how each one of us views the world.

Discourses are implicit whenever the different languages of communication are used. As we talk, write, move, draw, interact, think and act, we are doing so through discourses. However, we are typically not aware of the discourses out of which we operate. It is only when we encounter a challenge to a tacit belief that our beliefs and values might become visible and available for critique.

Discourses are internally constructed frameworks that we have created out of a myriad of previous encounters with people and texts. Bakhtin argues that the more our pervasive discourses are authoritative, the more we will tend to be uncompromising and rigid in our thinking and approach to life. The more internally persuasive they are, the more of a maverick we may be. Ideally, our discourses should balance views of authority (like social appropriateness) with our own internal views (like our beliefs on equality).

The concept of discourses radically alters how we view interactions with narratives and the evaluation of actions through drama. We can neither understand discourses nor extensively critique them without engaging with them and entering into dialogue with them.

If discourses are so pervasive yet so elusive, then how can we know what they are? Discourses are hinted at in our language and in our actions. One metaphor I have begun to use is that of shadows. We may not be able to see discourses but we can see the shadows they cast—in other words, ways of viewing the world inform how we position ourselves, how we evaluate others, and how we act. Prior, immediate, and anticipated actions are tangible (especially when we make them visible through drama conventions) and can always be interpreted and evaluated from the position of the person acting and a person affected. When we evaluate the consequences of our actions from the positions of those affected by our actions, then it is as if we see the shadows cast by our discourses. We can then begin to consider if those ways of acting—and thus the underlying discourses—are ones we identify with, or not.

I have only begun to understand how significant drama might be in assisting children and teachers to become aware of the discourses out of which they operate. One way in which drama work is unique is that it allows us to operate out of discourses in imagination without actually having to live with the consequences of the actions we imagine taking. In other words, we can align ourselves with any possible discourse and discover the shadows cast by those ways of acting in the world. Drama also encourages us to shift positions as we imagine and act from the position of a person affected by our actions. In other words, we can get outside a discourse and evaluate it from different positions.

Dialogue and Positioning

Dialogue as Conflict of Discourses

Neither discussions nor changes in role in themselves are a guarantee of dialogue.
Dialogue is not synonymous with conversation or argument—dialogue is ‘more than talk’ between people (Edmiston, 1994). Dialogue among people may be experienced as external conflict but more important is a person’s experience of internal conflict between different competing positions in which the underlying discourses in narratives are ‘dialogised’ (Edmiston, 1994, 1995, 1998a).

Discourses are dialogised when one discourse is placed in dialogue with another so that the underlying assumptions of one discourse, including ethical ones, are ‘seen’ through those in another. Through dialogising discourses we can stand outside and evaluate the assumptions that underlie a particular aspect of how we view the world. My writing and reading in the preparation of this paper were, for me, examples of dialogising discourses. In reading Winston’s book through my understandings of Bakhtin, his theoretical and practical assumptions came more clearly into view. Additionally, in reading drafts of my writing as well as in rereading Bakhtin, I did so through my changing understandings of neo-Aristotelian theory and achieved more clarity about my understandings of Bakhtin, and some changes in my theorising about my drama practice.

Discourses can be dialogised in drama when the language and actions in one encounter are ‘read’ through those in another. Placing children in a position where they have to choose between different options is unlikely to be sufficient to dialogise discourses. Further, dialogising discourses produces the kind of ‘both/and’ thinking needed to create more complex understandings. When discourses are not being dialogised then people can easily drift into the kind of ‘either/or’ thinking that can result in an experience of a dichotomous binary. Though there may be an intention to dialogue, the result may be the opposite. As Winston stresses, dialogue may also result in an intensification or ‘deepening’ of previously held positions (1998,p. 84). Instead of what Bakhtin calls ‘interillumination’ between different positions, people may become more resistant to different positions, and more entrenched in their existing views (Edmiston, 1998b, pp. 110–112). I believe that this occurred, to some extent, in the example from Winston’s work that I discuss below (1998, pp. 144–171).

In five one-hour sessions with 9–10-year-old children following the reading and discussion of a traditional Ojibway Native American tale, ‘The Star Maiden’, Winston initially took on the role of a young Tribal Chairman and then the role of his grandfather (5). When the children were in role, this was mostly as tribal members. His aim was to present the students with a conflict between contemporary and traditional values. The Tribal Chairman advocated a Western ethic of ‘economic progress’ to be created through the proposed sale of tribal land; his grandfather opposed any sale of land.

In his analysis Winston lamented that ‘I singularly failed to arouse any sympathy for his dilemma... the Chief’s arguments in favour of a hospital, new housing, jobs, and better prospects fell on deaf ears again and again’ (1998, p. 168). Factors that may well have been significant and which Winston suggested in his search for an explanation were the students’ age and a ‘dramatic imbalance’ between his representation of the grandfather as a sympathetic victim and his representation of the grandson Tribal Chairman as a modern executive.

However, I suggest that Winston may have inadvertently set up dichotomous ethical
stances because the discourses underlying each position were not being dialogised in dialogue. As in the previous example, Winston seems to have assumed that a repeated use of teacher in role would be sufficient for the students to experience a moral dilemma. Again, the students were primarily positioned as reactive evaluators, never as people who had taken significant action. The students did create images, but these were to explain a dream of the Tribal Chairman’s that the teacher narrated; they showed images of selling land without the people’s consent. The images represented highly ethical feelings of betrayal that solidified during the drama sessions. However, they did not create images of actions that might have been taken in response to the moral dilemma.

Careful sequencing of activities, what I have called ‘dialogic sequencing’ (1994), can promote the dialogising of discourses so that the children experience a resonance with the consequences of actions from previous encounters. The conflict that occurs in drama is not actually between people but between the discourses out of which different people are operating. Sequencing which recognises this will mean that students will be more likely to experience, and over time explore, the conflicting discourses of a moral dilemma or other ethical aspects of narratives.

Alternatively, if prior to meeting the Tribal Chairman the students had initially invented their own images of how people on the reservation might have experienced hardships leading to the highly improbable scenario that Tribal Chairman wanted to sell off land, then they could have taken actions and shown interactions grounded in discourses of ‘economic progress’. Then when the children met the teacher in role as the Tribal Chairman much of what he and they would say could connect with the actions and discourses that the students would have previously invented. Superficially the encounter between Tribal Chairman and people would have seemed no different, but the quality of the dialogue would have been changed. Instead of an exchange of words, there would have been more likelihood of a dialogue involving a conflict and dialogising of discourses, and thus an exploration of the moral dilemma, at least from a Western perspective.

Winston usefully identifies three key facets of ‘dramatic dialogues’ (1998, p. 113). First, dialogues should be emotional in Martha Nussbaum’s sense that cognitive illumination occurs through the emotions experienced in fictional encounters. Second, they should explore the moral ambiguities of narratives rather than implicitly accept a story’s didactic ‘moral’. Third, as Martin Esslin has argued, the words in dialogues should be actions in the sense that they have an effect on how speaker and/or spoken to sees their situation and changes subsequent actions. Considering the three facets of dialogue, which Winston identifies, is crucial; however, structuring for dialogue that dialogises discourses is more complex than this list suggests.

The emotional nature of dialogue must be more than feelings in the moment. Unless the children care about the problems being explored in drama and deepen their care over time there will be little engagement (Edmiston, 1998d) and no possibility of dialogue. Further, their emotional engagement has to be with multiple sides of a dilemma. That is why it is so important for the children to create their own images and express their own positions.

Similarly, as I have discussed above, the moral ambiguities of narratives cannot
simply be presented to the children; the children themselves must actively be involved in creating a sequence of activities that will lead to an experience of conflict between discourses. Finally, I propose that it is when the children experience a conflict among discourses that discourses are dialogised, so that as Esslin notes, words become actions affecting viewpoint and later actions.

**Positions and Social Roles in Drama**

I need to discuss why, in addition to the more usual term ‘role’, I have been using the term ‘position’ throughout this paper. In this section I show why I see the concept of positioning as integral to understanding the ethical nature of dialogue.

Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harré (1990) have recently proposed the concept of ‘positioning’ as a more useful way to conceptualise what happens as people interact and encounter conflicting interpretations of events. When we talk about a person’s social role in everyday life or in drama, the term emphasises individuality and suggests that their relationship with others is somehow static. However, as Davies and Harré demonstrate, two people who each maintain their same social roles are at the same time in dynamic interactions with others—each has a ‘position’ relative to the other informed by the immediate situation and by social narratives.

Davies and Harré explain positioning in terms of narratives—as each person speaks he or she positions the other person to accept their narrative thrust of the unfoldings ‘story’ that is being advanced and co-constructed through the back-and-forth exchanges of the dialogue. However, as I argued in the previous section, we can usefully see narratives as composed of discourses. In dialogue that evaluates prior events, different people will offer different interpretations of actions. These interpretations will be debated as people try to co-construct, agree on, and evaluate the story of what happened, why it happened, and what should happen in response. These evaluations will be grounded in different discourses.

From an ethical standpoint, changes in our positions affect how we evaluate actions. People’s interpretations and evaluations of events are different because each person operates out of different discourses. People ‘see’ and interpret the world differently because they have previously formed different assumptions, expectations, and explanations for why people act as they do. As Winston argues, when we make sense of actions we draw on the narratives we already know (1998, pp. 18–24). However, his assumption that prior narratives will not dictate our choices as we narrate our lives or create a narrative with others in drama assumes a rational detachment from the discourses embedded in those narratives. Davies and Harré would argue, as would Bakhtin, that such detachment is impossible. The narratives we already know are intertwined within and across the discourses that inform our viewpoints on the world and which, in particular, guide our views of how we ought to interpret and evaluate a person’s actions and then react.

Just as Heathcote (1984) turned to sociology to appropriate Erving Goffman’s term ‘role’ for the field of drama, I suggest that we return to sociology for the terms ‘position’ and ‘positioning’. Thinking of ourselves solely in terms of being ‘in’ or ‘out’ of ‘role’ can be very limiting. We may deceive ourselves into thinking that negotiations have largely ended among teacher and students once there is agreement on a fictional situation and
talk as if in a different time and/or place. The ‘roles’ we adopt give us generic social status, authority, and potential power relative to one another. However, a person’s ‘position’ describes how he or she uses status, authority, and power in the ‘positioning’ of others. A person’s changing positions relative to others are grounded in the ethical assumptions he or she brings to each particular encounter, each specific interpretation of events, and his or her evaluation of how people ought to react.

Considering how people jostle for positioning reminds us that making drama together involves not only negotiations about the unfolding drama narratives but also a struggle around which discourses will be examined or interrogated leaving other discourses to operate largely unquestioned. When we recognise that in every exchange people position themselves and each other, then we can more easily realise that the negotiation of meanings in drama is also an ongoing struggle for agreement about which ethical discourses will predominate in the evolving drama narratives. Likewise, we must recognise that how students position each other, the teacher, and themselves as well as how the teacher does likewise affects how discourses are operating in the interpretation and creation of narratives.

I make two proposals: (1) teachers’ understanding of how positioning operates is important for understanding how to sequence drama work so that discourses may be dialogised; and (2) students’ understanding of how positioning operates in drama could help them understand its operation in everyday life. This section provides an introductory consideration of the first proposal, and leaves the second largely unexamined.

In order to illustrate how students and teacher can position each other in drama, I reproduce, in its entirety, an example from Winston’s drama work that followed reading the folktale ‘The Brahmin, the Thief and the Ogre’ (1998, p. 114). The teacher, in role as the Brahmin, was asking the students, in role as the villagers, how he should respond to the thief asking him for one of his two calves.

Brahmin: So is he threatening me? Is he saying, ‘Give me a calf or else I’m going to steal something?’
Villager: No!
Villager: He only wants to be your friend.
Brahmin: He only wants to be my friend? So he comes round and tries to steal things from me! Is that the way to be friendly to somebody?
Villager: No, he wants to start a new life.
Villager: He wants you to help him as well.
Brahmin: Well look, I don’t know.
Villager: Well you’re being a bit greedy with two. Why don’t you give him just one?
Brahmin: I’m not being greedy with two! They’re mine.
Villager: You shouldn’t have two! You should have one!
Brahmin: Why should I only have one?
Villager: You’re too greedy!
Villager: Cos, if you give him one you’ll still have one left, won’t you?
Brahmin: Do you think that’s fair?
Villager: Yeah! We’re only trying to help him!
Villager: Give him a calf!
Brahmin: Is that going to help him be a better person?
Villager: Yeah!
Villager: He’ll be happy if you did that.
Brahmin: He’ll be happy and a better person?
Villager: He’s got three children and he can’t get a job and he needs food.
Villager: And he can’t get any money.
Brahmin: Will I be a better person if I give him a calf?
Villager: Yeah!
Brahmin: Why will I be a better person if I give him a calf?
Villager: ’Cos you’ll be sharing.
Villager: You could share with him.
Brahmin: If you were me would you give him a calf?
Villager: Of course, I would!
Villager: Yeah!
Brahmin: But I’ll have to work harder with just one calf!
Villager: But if you have one calf and he has one calf then everyone will be happy.

In the encounter, the children were positioned to react to Winston/Brahmin’s authoritative discourses about right and wrong and becoming good. Initially, Winston positioned himself as operating out of a discourse that could be described as ‘not trusting a person who had been a thief’. After being positioned by children as greedy, he shifted position to operate out of a discourse of ‘giving makes a receiver and a giver better people’.

Those children who spoke, maintained their positions throughout the exchange. They positioned themselves, relative to the thief, as operating out of a discourse of friendship: ‘He only wants to be your friend … wants you to help him … we’re trying to help … give him a calf … he’ll be happy … he needs food … you’ll be sharing … everyone will be happy’. The children/villagers positioned the teacher/Brahmin throughout as someone who ought to help the thief.

The encounter was a struggle between different discourses as to which would be the predominant way of ethically evaluating the actions of the thief (‘not trusting a person who had been a thief’ vs ‘friendship’). The children’s discourse of ‘friendship’ prevailed. Overall, the children’s experience of the encounter seemed closer to a positioning of discourses as a dichotomous presentation of stances than it was to a dialogic exchange.

This exchange was successful in the sense that because of these interactions the children were required to express, clarify, and explain an ethical position [6]. However, they did not examine or critique the discourse of ‘friendship’ out of which they were operating. Nor did they seriously explore the teacher’s positions. The teacher/Brahmin’s initial discourse (‘not trusting a person who had been a thief’) was overridden and his subsequent discourse (‘giving makes a receiver and a giver better people’) was left largely unconsidered.

In re-examination of my own practice, I recognised many similar encounters where students experienced competing discourses as binary oppositions—toomany resulted in unproductive confrontations. However, once I began to sequence dialogically I discov-
erated that early experiences of binary oppositions, when regarded as a starting point for further work, were actually productive.

One example comes from the first of three approximately hour-long sessions in ‘The Space Traders Drama’, based on the premise of a short story by Derek Bell (1993). I will describe the major activities in a sequence conducted with one of five groups of 13-year-old students [7].

**Session One.** The students agreed to adopt the role of US Senators in the future with authority for major national policy decisions. As yet, the discourses associate with their positions were unstated. Using still images they invented how the country might be seen to be facing economic and environmental ruin from the position of people affected by actual and imminent disasters; they also listed areas of government expenditure. When asked to identify and justiﬁe the possible elimination of budget items, students gave short speeches from the positions of senators who could exercise power and make policy as they voted overwhelmingly to eliminate welfare payments. As if in secret, the students/senators then met the teacher, in role as a space trader from another planet, with the position of being prepared to trade gold (more than enough to address their problems) for their ‘least valued people’. After intense discussion the students decided that the senators would have voted overwhelmingly to accept the offer and exchange welfare recipients for the gold. Students/senators gave reasons for their decisions when interviewed as if by a radio talk-show host. Finally, through guided imagery, still images, and writing at home, students imagined events that, from the position of welfare recipients, could have been contributory factors in their needing public assistance.

The particular encounter I analyse initially is when the senators gave reasons for their decisions. As the teacher I was basically a facilitator at this time and was largely uninvolved in positioning. Despite asking students to physically place themselves on a continuum from ‘completely in agreement’ to ‘totally opposed’, as students voiced opinions the class atmosphere became polarised. On the one hand were the vast majority who were in favour, typiﬁed by the dominant voices of Ron (‘... It doesn’t matter if they die, they’re worthless anyway…’) and Nancy (‘... we should cut welfare and send these people with the aliens... they will be made to do some good for society…’). These two positioned themselves, relative to the welfare recipients, as in broad agreement with the extreme element of a highly authoritative dominant discourse, which was prevalent at that time due to intense national debate about ‘welfare reform’. This was a discourse that could be summarised as follows: ‘most welfare recipients neither needed nor deserved financial public support’. The position the students adopted remained consistent despite the comments of those in opposition to the trade. Bethany was one of a minority who positioned herself, relative to the welfare recipients, as operating out of a discourse that evaluated the proposed action as the enslavement of people. Bethany: ‘... Mistreating people! It’s just like the slaves! We have no right to do this!...’. Relative to each other the students positioned one another oppositionally. Positions were expressed, and perhaps clariﬁed, but there was no apparent reconsideration of discourses.
Session Two. After sharing extracts from the writing they had completed the previous evening, students imagined being able to secretly observe the people (the former welfare recipients) in a holding prison. Then they imagined the thoughts of family members, and gave public interviews as family members and other citizens. In positioning these others the students tended to operate out of discourses that stressed the humanity of the people. For example, Nancy wrote: ‘... Is it a person’s fault if they don’t have a job? ... I can see that it might not be a person’s choice ...’.

Using still images in small groups, the students presented possible worst and best outcomes from the positions of the people as they discussed whether they would have risked one for the other. Their discourses now related mostly to likely social and cultural losses, for example, family members they would never see again, having fun with friends, and missed major sporting events. Finally, in writing letters from the position of the people on their last night on Earth reacting to previous events, some students broadened their discourses to become more political. Nancy wrote to the President: ‘... haven’t you ever heard of someone making a mistake or having problems beyond their control? ... I’m worried that my children won’t get an education ... I didn’t think this was what America was all about ... you’re not solving the problem, you are running away from it! ...’.

Session Three. The teacher, in role as the prison warden, arrived to remove the people—the students refused to leave. Later, returning to the role of senators, they reconsidered their previous position as they revoked the earlier vote and decided to change government policies and financial priorities. Finally, the students discussed questions raised for them about issues of welfare and social justice.

In contrast to the encounter from Session One, I want to examine the encounter at the beginning of the third session when the teacher in role as the prison warden attempted to hand over the people to the space traders. The teacher/warden, relative to the welfare recipients, positioned himself as in support of the discourse which had been so dominant in the first session (‘most welfare recipients neither needed nor deserved financial public support’), echoing earlier student comments through his attitude and language: ‘You’re just worthless. I don’t know why the aliens want you ... you can’t even follow the rules of society. You are scum!’ In response to this positioning, and relative to the welfare recipients, students operated out of discourses of respect for people who have their own histories and are in favour of helping, rather than hurting, people who are in need. The exchange with the students was intense as the students retorted: ‘You’ve no right to talk to us like that! ... You don’t even know our stories ... Did you ever think of helping instead of kicking people when they are down?’ In this dramatic encounter (as well as in their subsequent discussions), the previously dominant discourse was being seriously challenged from alternative discursive positions. Though there were heated exchanges, it seems that for many students at least the discourses were not experienced as locked in binaries. Though voiced by the teacher, following the intervening sessions, the previously dominant discourse (‘most welfare
recipients neither needed nor deserved financial public support’) was no longer as authoritative in the classroom—it could now be viewed by every student through all the additional discourses which had been voiced in the interim. For those students who had previously resonated strongly with discourses that were dismissive of welfare recipients the dialogic sequencing of the work created a strong likelihood that such discourses would be dialogised and that they would experience internal conflict among different discourses that can be drawn on to evaluate the sociocultural issues of welfare. Ron’s and Nancy’s subsequent statements suggested that this had occurred for them. Ron: ‘I’ve changed my mind. You can’t decide for people. Even if we need the money we can’t make them go—they’re people too … and we have to consider their families and their feelings and what’s really fair … I think we would be just causing more problems that we solved …’. Nancy: ‘… Eliminating welfare isn’t even the point to me now. The point is making it clear what we care about, how we want people to behave and how we will help them to do that before and when they have problems, because the problems will happen’.

The dialogic sequencing of drama can create a ‘layering’ effect of positioning so that, as the drama narratives are being negotiated and debated, more aspects of the discourses out of which students (and as I consider below, the teacher) are operating can become visible and more contested. One discourse becomes more visible when it is illuminated through another. This may lead to students substantially re-evaluating positions and the ethical assumptions underlying them.

In his critique of my work, Winston makes a very important point, with which I am in full agreement, that the experiences of a few students cannot be generalised as a claim for a change in attitudes by everyone in a class (1998, p. 83)[8]. In reviewing the chapter (1995) to which he was referring, I can now see from my choice of words that it was reasonable for Winston to believe that I was making such a claim. So, let me make it very clear now that I am not suggesting that the discourses of all students will be dialogised in drama as their positions shift in dialogic sequencing. I am only proposing that our sequencing can make it more likely that this occurs for more children.

Furthermore, I want to emphasise that when discourses are dialogised this does not mean that we discard one to replace it with another. I am not suggesting that because students switched positions in drama or showed a change in attitude and language (as there was with some of the students) there had been a radical move from being callous to being caring, or from being prejudiced to being unprejudiced [9]. Rather, some students, like Ron, seem to have become more aware of the implications of operating out of a highly authoritative discourse that, for example, positions people receiving welfare benefits as ‘worthless’.

However, not all discourses will be engaged and dialogised during drama work. Other authoritative discourses, for example, those which position people paternalistically, may be left uncontested. Nancy’s final written remarks suggest that she may have been operating out of such a discourse, when she said that ‘we’ (and thus not ‘them’) need to be ‘clear what we care about, how we want people to behave and how we will help them to do that’.

Since discourses are not ‘mine’ but are socially constructed and culturally shared ways of interpreting and evaluating people’s actions in the world, dialogising discourses does
not mean that we ever let go of particular ways of looking at the world. However, by evaluating the consequences of our actions in drama from the position of those affected, we may be able to stand outside and begin to evaluate those discourses through which we have viewed the world [10].

Closing Questions

I have outlined some of the practical implications of sequencing drama for ethical education using a Bakhtinian theoretical framework. I do not want to suggest that I have thereby reached a tidy conclusion. To emphasise my desire for more dialogue I close by sharing some of my more pressing questions.

I have described and analysed ethical dimensions of using drama over a relatively short period of time. I wonder how effective using drama over a much more extensive period might be in assisting students and teachers to become more aware of the complexities of ethical discourses operating in our lives, in the lives of others, in narratives, and in society as a whole. In particular, how might drama help us develop a sense of agency and power related to discourses?

We tend to consider how students’ discourses and positions are affected by drama. But what of our ethical assumptions as teachers and our positioning of students? We cannot teach without taking ethical stances, but how can we become more critically aware of how our own ethical understandings ground the moves we make as teachers? And how can we more effectively dialogue our own discourses so that we can avoid more subtle manifestations of moralistic and relativistic ethical stances?

I believe that because we ultimately teach who we are, we would be denying our own humanity if we did not bring what we value and what we have come to believe about justice and equity into the classroom and into our drama work. I believe that we should strive to make the classroom an ethical space, one that acknowledges and explores diverse and contradictory experiences and stances (1998c).

I make no apology about my advocacy of kindness, respect, tolerance, equity, and justice and my opposition to hatred, disrespect, intolerance, inequity, and injustice (11). I strive to develop an ethical stance that does not judge others as moral/immoral people but draws attention to the consequences of operating out of discourses that tend to promote discrimination, injustice, racism, sexism, and other ways in which adults and children are demeaned and treated inequitably. However, every discourse casts a shadow. I would be foolish if I did not recognise that students experience in different ways the power and authority which flow from my discourses. Even when I intend to be just and equitable in dialogue (as well as open and accepting of all positions) I cannot avoid some unintentional closing down of options and ideas. Further, from some people’s ethical viewpoints I will be perceived as promoting unjust or unfair views. Though I am ready to be answerable, I wonder how I might become more aware and accepting of the inevitable incompleteness and inadequacy of my ethical positions, discourses, and actions.

For Bakhtin, ‘Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree ... (a person) invests his (or her) entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life’ (1984, p. 293). As I struggle to recognise, accept, question, and reshape my understanding
of the complexity of the discourses out of which we operate, I seek those with whom I can discover greater understanding through ongoing dialogue.

Notes

[1] Note that Winston and I both use the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ interchangeably.

[2] It is important to stress that my understandings are the result of developments in my thinking over most of the previous decade. What I state here is not always entirely consistent with my earlier writings. Additionally, in attempting to synthesise and distinguish between our philosophical and practical approaches, I am aware that I am likely to have overgeneralised and misrepresented some of Winston’s complex theoretical positions and sophisticated practice. I apologise for these errors in advance. My aim is not to denigrate Winston’s work, since he is clearly both a committed teacher and a well-read scholar, but to evaluate the meaning and practice of ethical education using a different theoretical framework.

[3] Note that I am here taking ‘action’ to mean physical action. In the next section I consider Winston’s point that words can also be considered as action.


[5] I could consider issues of cultural representation at this point to discuss the cultural dimension of ethics and how values from one culture can be imposed on another. However, I have chosen not to do so because of the focus of this paper. In Chapter 10 Winston has, at length, addressed potential difficulties with respect to issues of representation. In her review of Winston’s book, Sharon Grady (1998) has made reference to some of her additional concerns, which I share. As I noted in the previous part of the paper, when we attempt to represent people and dilemmas from other cultures, we need to acknowledge that no matter how much we intend to ‘get it right’, we can just as easily ‘get it wrong’. Winston has, I believe, got it wrong in this case. First, though he notes (p. 116) that his intention was to draw a parallel between money made on reservation-situated casinos and a proposal to sell native land, it is almost unthinkable that a tribal leader would promote the sale of native land in contemporary relations between native and non-native people. Second, the term for an elected male leader is not a ‘chief’ but a ‘tribal chairman’ or ‘chairperson’.

[6] Based on his description, I disagree with Winston’s belief that there was an ‘interrogation of their view of fairness’ (p. 115).

[7] Winston (1998, pp. 82–84) critiques a briefer and less developed description of this drama work (Edmiston, 1995). The descriptions in this paper are based on a later more extensive analysis (Edmiston, 1998a). Winston (p. 83) makes the very important point that readers should be sceptical of generalised descriptions of drama work that can all too easily make no reference to how work can be introduced in such a way as to indicate what responses the teacher is expecting. I fully agree with his cautionary comment. One focus of my doctoral dissertation (1991) was related to this point. Whilst I have been impressed with the detail of his case study descriptions, I am also aware that we cannot always describe practice adequately to suit all readers’ purposes. I have provided as detailed descriptions as I could of this work, given the space constraints.

[8] Winston further suggests that children may be saying what they perceive the teacher wants to hear. Though I agree, in principle, with his point, for the reasons outlined in this paper, I disagree with his interpretation as an adequate explanation.

[9] Winston (1998, p. 82) implies that I believe this happened. I want to be clear that if my earlier writing suggested this I now reject such a notion.

[10] An important aspect of the positioning of discourses that I have not addressed in this paper is the fact that as we evaluate one discourse we are always operating out of other discourses. More complex dialogic structuring that is multilayered creates the opportunity for many discourses to be illuminated successively.
Winston (1998, p. 83) argues that, by wanting students to be less prejudiced, I had a single perspective in mind as a predetermined moral outcome. It should be clear from this paper that a desire for equity does not equate with having a moralistic agenda. Further, he argues that my own ethical understandings were not open to critique. Again, if my earlier writing suggested such a view, I argue the contrary. In ethical deliberations we must be prepared to scrutinise our own discourses.

References


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